with Protestantism; and Durkheim the rise of capitalism's division of labor. As capitalism was in its infancv. nonc was certain that modern industrial , , capitalism would take widely different forms, though Weber described a number of different forms, incluhng booty, political, irnperidist, colonial, adventure, and fiscal capitalism (1978, 1 6 4 67; see also Swedberg 1998,47). The comparative and historical methrtds these men dcvcloped were designed to explain why human beha\lor varied over time and across contexts.
Histr)rical analysts often build directly on the problematic that Marx, Durkheim, and Weber sketched-how did modern economic practices come about? Comparative analysts often take another tack, trying to understand the social forces that cause modein economic svstenls to differ so dramatically. If human nature drives the cvolurion vf economic systems and if human nature is univcrsal, why do-economic systems take such diffcrent forms? Historical and comparative works in c(on0rmc sociology point to sncijety itsclf, suggesting that societies develop dong dyerent tralectories for reasons having to do with history and happenstance, I n &s chapter I review hstorical and comparative works in economic sociology that seek t o explan the substantial variation found hl ecnnornic hehavior across time and space. Whde most sociologists share the view that economlc behavior parterns are driven by sni~al processes rachcr than by insnnct alone, they have ,argued that different sorts of social prncesrcs are primary. Snme focus on power relations, others o n instirutions and soda1 innrentions, and still others on soci:d networks and roles. Comparauve and historical sociologists once mated these perspectives as alternatives, but they incrcas'mgly treat them as complementary.
Next I review the theorencal underpinnings of pomTer, institutional, and network approaches. Then I sketch thc anal?uc methods used by hlstor~cal and cornpxauve sociologists bcfi~re turiing to a review of rnlpirical studies.
How Poww, Ivadtu tions, a d Network3 Shape fiomonsic Behavior
Most eco~lomic sociologsts proceed induc tivelv, locking at how econurnis behavior varies over time or across countries md tracing h a t variation to s o m e h g about soual contrxl. This is quite different from the appruach of most neoclas~icd economists, who proceed deducdvcly frum thc premise that indl\idual sclf-interest explains economic behavior. Studies alinvestmcnt among early Protestants, management of new enterprises in China's market-oriented sectur, and busines swategy among Arccntine wine producers have producrd myriad insights about the forces that shape economic behavior. But rbnc of three different social processes is usually at thc heart af thc matter, and these processes have becn spelled out in power, institutiond. and network theories.
Power relauotls shape economic behavior, both hrccdy, as whcn a powerful firm hctatcs tu a weak suppber, and indirccd~, ,IS when a powerful industry grrwp shapes regulabon to its own advantage. The strucmrd theory of power is the direct inheritor of Marx's ideas, even if nnt all of its pracutiunrrs would call themselves Marxists They includc Neil FLigstein j 1990 ), Willimm Roy (1997) , Beth Mintz and Michael Scl~warta (1 9851, Michael Useem (19961, ,md Charles I'errow (2002) . Their concern is with how powerhl groups succeed in promuting practices and public policies that arc in their in terrst as being in thr common intercn. hlarx descnbed the capitahst state as J tool of thc capitalist class, which justified its existence under the bpise of political l i b e r h m . His idea \-as that modern states scrve one group while claiming to embody principles that bcnzfit everyone. Struchlrd theorists of power explore the role that power pIa!-s in determining the state policies, corporate suatrg,ies, and individual behaviors that we take to be rransparendy rational. N'hen a particular group succeeds in promoting its favorite public pollr; o r business strategy-in making &at approach the new convention-hat paup can reinforce its own POWPT or wealth without having to exercise constant coercion.
Social institurion~cinveildons and the meanings thry L v e for people--shape cconomir: action. Weber (1978) argued that sc~lal conventions must be understood in-tcrms of their subjective meaning to individuals because we behave in ways that arc mcaniagful to us-that we understand (see Swedberg 1998 
Power amd tbe Labor h c e n
Marx was concerned with how power operated ~t l the mudern factory, in nr) small part beca~rse he thought that the d o~n f a l l of caprtalism ~w~u l d come as workers rect-rsmzeil that po\vcr and exploitanc~n were at the ccntrr of the hcxory pmducuon system. For Marx, physical coercion and thc threat of disnlissal gave capital~ts d~e powcr to dictate t o workcn and prevent inrurgzncr~. Bumwov, Bicrnacki, Kirnrlrlorf, and Shethav arc interested in why workers resibt capitahst class pnwcr, and why they fail to resist.
Michat.1 Rura WOK H n n~ Facto~y Producr~on Absorbs Class Uo~flicr
Bur;lwoy's Manf! fu c t~n n Cunsertt ( 1979) i> an ethnogr~phy of factory producuon, but it is a H urk of hisroncd sc~c~c~logy because Uumwuy comparcs tus experiences rc-~th those of Dunald b y , who conducted a similar study in the same hctor). 30 years e.xher. In both cases, workers were drawn intc) the garne of ulsrcasing prrducuon by the character uf the labur process. This machine shop operated on a prce ritz system, and "making out" under this gstern w a J. gamc that workers played eagerly. What changed ovrr this period, and what ~ppeared to Bur~w o y to have danpcncd class conflict and undertnined worker resistmce and activism, u a~ :hc. way m which work was directed. When Roy was there, time-and-mouon men n-ilked the floor of the fac~o-ry, and &sent was pdtical in nature m d was directed duectly at thesr management surrogates. By thc nme Burawoy arrived, engineering studies were done by men in faraway offices, and 111 consequence the workers were less Ucly to develop polrricdy motivatrd coruplaints apmst nmlagerncnt. When the shop seemed t o operate as an agent-less absmct game, the clau s c l d c t that Marx had predicted evaporated.
X irbn rd Biern~ckr: ?he Cult~raI Cuvzst~ucti~n

of L b n u
In The Fabrication of hbrw (l995), Biernacki mes to undersrand why German unions dwc.lopcd a tnorc Marxian critiyiie of capitalism than did British unions, which focused on negotiating a good dral for workers r a h e r than cln changing the capitaliu system. Biernacki traces thcsr Merences to ddfirent labcv institutions and views of thc role r~f l~hor in thc prduction process. In Britam, tcxtile workers were paid fur their nutput and penzrd y treatcd as independent contractors. 111 Germany, workers thought thcy were being paid for the labor itself-for each pass of the shuttlc through the Ioom-and they were held under thc close turehge of managers. British workers &us came tu sec thrnueIves as independcn ts who contractrd u-inlth capitalists, whereas German workers saw themseives as d~c serrmts of the cdpitaiist class. Bierndcki traces d~ffrrrnces in worlung conditions t o dlc timing of the rise uf markets fur cummdities and for labclr. In Britain, the market for commodities a r~s e first, and rvllen a free lahor market emergcd, workers saw themselves a3 producers nf commodities. In Germany, the nt-i-o markets arose at the same time, aEd workers came to view the labor markct as a place to sell thcir labor pvwcr rad~er than as a placc to sell thc products of their 
~f p~~z t i c i m t i o n
of Manapewent Yehouda Shenhav's Manufnrt~trin~ Rational??: 'TKc Enfiinetnqg Fotlndatior~~ of the M a n a~e~a l Rmolfition (2 000) cxplures how brhvecn 1875 and 1925, American managers came to define their rolc n u t as d~e suppression nt'labur bur as thc technical cor>rdir~atian of workers and work processes.
They did this in a quest for leptimasy, given the puliricd activism of the working class. Engineers trmslated their experhe in systematization and rarionahzation into a managenlent rhetoric, and in the process they won an il>crzasing share of major management positions. T h q spread the word through their journals that the enbjneering h n ction could be extended From the design of machines to the design and rationalization of the work process ~tsclf and that management would thus come tv be based in sciencr rather than in politics. In comparing the urorlci's religions, Weber found that others wcl-e orienred t o sal\.ation but that h e y preached very different routcs (Swtrdberg 1998, 138 Whitlev finds that dit'fsrent national ideas sbour efficiency, as instituuonalizrd in national busiicss >ystems, correspund wid1 different prescriptions j i~r rconomic bchaviclr. W d e v finds that a numbcr of different economic systems appear to be about equally effcitive. Wcber did nor judge the efficacv of the diitkrent roads to salvation.
Whitlcy begins w~r h national economic and political institurinns, whch offer a particular undcrstanding of the relationships between stare and industry, buycr and supplier, h~m c e and industry. Instiruuo~~s arisc for reasons of history and happenstance, but ovcr rime ancillay customs and conventions emerge that hold them in place-a process that Brian Arthur (1988) terms "lock-in."
In a famous illusuation, Pad David (1985) sho\i.s that while the rypewriter keyboard layout was dcsigned to slclu typists to thr spted of thc early typewriter, orwc people learned the arrangement of the krys it became impossible to intrriduce a new arrangement of kevs. Once in place, thc original system uras difficulr co displace because typisn 1cxnc.d it and found that it proved effective enough. IVhidcy and other comparativists a r p c that econumic conventions become similarly n~stitutional-izcd, as people comc to rake them for g r a~t e d and learn how to operate with them.
Whitla. (1992a) h s r s e t h s sights on East .%ran business systems. In Japan, h c large corporaoon, or bni~hhrr, dominates; thc bank-dominated husiness group, the descendent uf the prewar mibcstrsl, brings tugerher largc diverse firms: the state actively promotcs export.1 and plans industry expanswn. In Korea. the family-controlled conglomerrrz, nr chaebol, dominates; symbiotic relationships among conglomerate membcrs characterize interfirm relations; and the state actively promotes thc rise and expxuioi~ of huge and stablc empires. In Taiwan and Hnng Kong, smaller Chinese hmiIy
